












































In this article, we stress the impact of sophistication on stocks repurchase behavior by individual 
investors. By analyzing a large database of 8’072’016 trades by 84’500 individual French 
investors from 1999 to 2006, we evidence at aggregated and individual level that investors 
prefer to repurchase stocks they previously sold for a gain and stocks that have lost value since 
being sold. These patterns of repurchase emphasize the role played by anticipated and 
experienced regret in trading decisions. Based on direct measures of sophistication (trading of 
foreign assets, derivative assets and bonds) and an indirect one (wealth), we demonstrate that 
less sophisticated investors are more prone to these biases in repurchase behavior. Besides, we 
show that portfolio performance of investors are not directly related to these repurchase 
preferences. 
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In accordance with standard finance models, investment decisions should be based on rational 
expectations of future stock prices. Consequently, purchase and repurchase decisions should be 
independent of the past performance of stocks, of the remembering associated to their sale, or 
of behavioral biases. However, cognitive capacities are limited, and investors cannot manage all 
information simultaneously. When building and rebalancing their portfolio, they naturally simplify 
the decision-making process, by reducing the set of possibilities they are facing. About purchase 
behavior, investors are more prone to buy stocks that grab their attention, through financial news, 
abnormal volume or extreme performance (Barber and Odean, 2008). Others attention grabbing 
events have been studied, such as stock hitting upper price limits (Seasholes and Wu, 2007) 
dividend announcements (Graham and Kumar, 2004) and earnings announcements (Lee, 1992). 
The attention-based buying behavior is confirmed in each case. Besides, they are more likely to 
invest in the familiar while ignoring the principles of portfolio theory (Huberman, 2001; Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, 2001) and due to the extrapolation bias, they tend to prefer past winning stocks 
(De Bondt, 1993). 
More recently, Strahilevitz et al. (2011) established two patterns of repurchase selection on a 
U.S database. They found that investors prefer to: (1) repurchase stocks they previously sold for 
a gain and (2) repurchase stocks that have lost value since being sold. Strahilevitz et al. (2011)  
test several rational explanations for these behaviors. First, they prove that repurchase patterns 
are not motivated by superior skills or information, since investors do not benefit from these 
trades. Secondly, they show that the repurchases biases are not guided by skills the investors 
might believe to have.  Then, they establish that repurchase behaviors are not tax-motivated. 
Lastly they demonstrate that investors do not believe in mean reversion of stock returns. The 
conclusions drawn from an experimental investigation on repurchase selection (Weber and 
Welfens, 2011) corroborates these additional results. Strahilevitz et al. (2011) give an emotion 
driven hypothesis, arguing that these patterns of repurchase are mainly motivated by investor’s 
desire to avoid regret. This assumption, in line with the investors limited rationality hypothesis, 
underlines the influence of emotions in investors choices. 
In this paper, we examine the degree to which investor’s sophistication can explain the existing 
heterogeneity in trading behavior. More precisely, we question the ability of sophisticated 
investors to control and decrease the role played by psychological factors in their financial 
decisions. 4 
 
Previous studies, concerning for instance the disposition effect, proved that investors’ 
sophistication, measured with individuals income and occupational status (Dhar and Zhu, 2006), 
or wealth, family size and education (Calvet et al., 2009), decreases the degree of the bias. 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) corroborate this result, identifying skilled investors with the 
diversification level and the number of investors’ trading rights
3.  Grinblatt, Keloharju and 
Linnainmaa (2011) show that high IQ investors as well are less likely to be inclined to the 
disposition effect. They also prove the existence of a link between intelligence and superior 
market timing, stock-picking skills, and trade execution. Yet, Chen et al.(2007) give evidence 
that experienced, middle-aged, active, wealthy, and urban investors exhibit greater disposition 
effect, overconfidence and representativeness bias. Along the same lines  Goetzmatn et Kumar 
(2001) evidence that high cognitive capacities investors trade more, have portfolio more 
concentrated and are more prone to overconfidence. The evidence is mixed when considering 
professional investors, who should be more sophisticated by definition. In an experimental 
study, Kaustia, Alho and Puttonnen (2008) demonstrate that financial market professionals 
show a much smaller anchoring effect in their long term stock return expectation than do 
university students. Grinblatt & Keloharju (2000) find that foreign institutional investors are less 
prone to  home bias. On the other hand, Coval & Shumway (2005) find that US market makers 
are highly loss averse, and Frazzini (2006) shows that US mutual funds exhibit the disposition 
effect to a similar degree as individual investors. In short, though the sophistication of investors 
influence their behavior, the direction of this impact is not clear-cut. 
 
In this work, we test the patterns of repurchase on a large French database and extend 
Strahilevitz et al.‘s work, bringing new evidence relative to the impact of investor sophistication 
on repurchase behavior. Originally, we consider investors to be sophisticated if they trade 
foreign assets, derivative assets and bonds. It is noteworthy to specify that  direct measure of 
sophistication are rarely used, in favor of demographics and socio economics variables 
correlated with financial literacy. Besides, we proxy the investor’s sophistication with the average 
portfolio value. Following Dhar and Zhu (2006), we suggest that high-income individual investors 
are more likely to solicit financial advisors such as financial and tax planners. Moreover, 
wealthier individuals also have more stocks and it’s more worthwhile for them to seek such 
                                                            
3 They hypothesize that sophisticated investors are inclined to receive more rights because they use more methods to 
trade. Indeed, in Popular Republic of China, investors apply for the “right” to trade with each method  (through their 
branch office, via telephone, via internet, etc.) and must receive authorization to place orders. 
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services. Thereby, even if they are not themselves sophisticated, they resort to professional who 
have the benefit of a sound experience on financial markets. They also have more opportunities 
to enjoy an access to financial education. We postulate that sophisticated investors are likely to 
exhibit greater skills in gathering and interpreting information. Additionally we believe that 
sophistication is correlated with a better understanding of stock investments. Actually, financial 
expertise should increase the propensity of trades backed on rational incentives.  
Results prove that sophisticated investors, identified with indirect and direct and never used 
measures, are less prone to the repurchase biases.  
Our work offers several contributions. First, by analyzing more than nine million trades, this work 
is the largest study of the repurchase behavior in a European context. Second, the biases are 
analyzed both at the aggregate and the individual level. The latter is not developed by 
Strahilevitz et al. (2011) who aggregate all observations across investors in their tests. Individual 
results enable to take the existing heterogeneity in behaviors into consideration. Third, we stress 
the impact of sophistication on the level of the individual repurchase biases. Finally, we examine 
how portfolio returns are related to repurchase biases. In fact, if repurchase biases are unrelated 
to performance, investors have little incentive to control it.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In a first section we describe our data and our methodology. 
Section 2 is dedicated to the presentation of our results relative to repurchase biases. In the third 
section we examine the portfolio performance of investors. Concluding remarks are presented in 
section 4.  
1.  Data and methodology   
a) Data 
The main data is provided by a large French brokerage house. We obtained trading records of 
85’400 investors over the period 1999-2006 that is 4'232’512 buy trades and 3’839’504 sell 
trades. We retained only trades of stocks and kept 2491 stocks for which we were able to build 
an historical daily price with data from Bloomberg and Eurofidai
4 . To study repurchase 
characteristics of investors, we must focus on the 34’129 who repurchased at least once. Note 
that the 51’271 removed investors realized only 1’186’740 transactions on the total number 





they do not repurchase and accordingly, cannot be included in our work, but their trades count 
for only 14.7% of total transactions. We present descriptive statistics of our data in table 1. 
Concerning trading behavior, on average, investors in our final sample have more trades (mean 
= 202 and median = 85) than the entire sample investors do (mean = 94 and median = 23). By 
construction, the average delay between 2 consecutive trades is negatively linked to number of 
trades. Therefore, it is lower in our sample (38 days) than in the entire date (52 days). Investors 
in our sample also trade higher cumulated amounts (mean = 818’327 EUR  and median = 
196’901 EUR) than those of the entire data (mean = 370’532 EUR and median = 39’001 EUR). 
In the same vein, the average number of years investors own active account, is higher in our 
sample (mean = 4.45 years and median = 7  years compared to mean= 3.91 years and median 
= 4 years in the entire sample). We consider that accounts are active when investors realize at 
least one transaction per year. The average number of days between consecutive trades is 
Finally, demographics show that in both the entire dataset and in our final sample most traders 
are men. 
We begin our transaction study on 01-01-2001. To understand this choice, imagine that a 
purchase of stock “A” occurs on this start date. To test if the purchase is actually a repurchase, 
we must go back in time to find out the last sale of this asset. Therefore, we need a lag to study 
past trades. We arbitrary set this period to one year. With this limit, we suppose that each sell 
trade of stock “A” that occurred before this year is not in investor’s mind any more. Consequently, 
we make the hypothesis that the agent do not remember she already held this stock in the past, 
and the trade realized on the 01-01-2001 is considered as a simple purchase and not as a 
repurchase. This lag is different from one investor to another, and even for a particular investor, 
it must differ contingent on the history related to trades. Note that, even imperfect, this limit is 
necessary to compute our tests. Now imagine that the last sale of stock “A” has been realized by 
the investor on the 01-01-2000. To study repurchase characteristics, we need one additional 
year (from January 2000 to January 1999, beginning date of our database) to find out purchases 






Figure 1: Time axis 
  
b)  Repurchase behavior and regret 
Regret is a common emotion the occurrence of which is experienced by each and everyone as 
an unpleasant feeling, mainly because it is perceived as a signal that the decision taken was the 
wrong one. Since it is associated to a disagreeable emotion, agents learn from experience to 
avoid its occurrence, by converting their preferences and adopting unconscious strategies 
(Coricelli  et al., 2005).  Knowing that people are more inclined to regret a choice when it 
represents a change compared to the initial situation (Inman and Zeelenberg, 2002; Kahnmenan 
and Miller, 1986), we hypothesize that repurchase decision may be driven by the investor’s 
desire to avoid negative emotions. This is the so-called “status quo effect”  which relates to the 
human natural tendency to maintain current decisions (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). 
Furthermore, rewards associated to new choices always seem inferior compared to 
disadvantages linked to the abandonment of the current decision (Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler, 1991). Besides, status quo is more likely to be preferred when available alternatives are 
large, such as in a context of portfolio management. 
To estimate the degree of repurchases, we compute the repurchase rate    at the aggregate 
and individual level as the ratio of repurchases over all purchases, whatever they are 
repurchases or real purchases: 
 
    	
     	      	  	      	           
     	      	  	      	         
 
 
     	
      	  	      	           	  	        	 




Notice that the analysis at an individual level allows considering the dependence it may exist 
between successive trades of a particular investor. Indeed, each decision may be correlated to 
another, for example when an investor chooses to repurchase the same stock at different times. 
In the next subsections, we focus of on the illustration of the repurchase biases. 
Test 1: Impact of experienced regret. Stocks previously sold for a gain versus stocks 
previously sold for a loss  
Two kind of regret can be defined, each of them impacting repurchase behavior. The first one, 
induced by counterfactual thinking, is known as  “experienced regret”, because it is felt after 
decisions. Roeses (1997) defines counterfactual thinking as mental representations of 
alternatives of the past. Literally, counterfactual means “contrary to the facts”, therefore it 
concerns an event that could have happened, but did not occur. Agents compare the outcome 
resulting from their choice with “what they would have if they selected the option they rejected”. 
If the comparison is disadvantageous, the regret is triggered. To illustrate this, consider the case 
of not having bought a stock when the price was lower. This decision is likely to provoke 
retrospective thoughts such as  “And what if I bought it before?”. Experienced regret influence 
repurchase decisions when an investor has sold a particular stock inducing a loss. Her 
memories associated to this sale are so disagreeable that she definitely wants to erase them 
from her mind. She thus behaves as if this investment option was not existing anymore and as a 
consequence, the share is no longer traded by this investor (Arkes, Kung, et Huzel 2002).  
While they try to escape to regret, investors are likely to engage in trades that yield positive 
emotions such as pride. Thereby, our first hypothesis is that investors are more prone to 
repurchase stocks previously sold for a gain rather than stocks previously sold for a loss. Note 
that, according to the efficient market hypothesis, past performance is not a relevant measure to 
manage a portfolio. Consequently, such preference is not expected. 
We follow Strahilevitz et al. (2011) by computing the number of previous winning / loosing stock 
repurchased divided by the number of opportunities to do so. It allows to control that the 
repurchase behavior observed is really linked to a previous profit / loss. Actually, in a bullish 
(bearish) market there are more occasions for investors to realize gains (losses), therefore 
simply counting the number of repurchases could bias the results. 
We determine if the previous sale constituted a realized gain or a realized loss, based on the 
reference price of the stock. Intuitively, the more correct reference price is the weighted average 9 
 
purchase price for the stock. However, in reality investors may remember only the latest price 
they paid to purchase the stock, or the lowest/highest one
5. In this work, we consider the last 
price as reference price . 
We first compute individual repurchase rate of prior winners       and individual repurchase 
rate of prior losers      
6: 
       
	      	  	     	       	           	  	        	 
	      	  	             	  	          	     	       	   	        	 	
 
 
       
	      	  	     	      	           	  	        	 
	      	  	             	  	          	     	      	   	        	 
 
 
After computing the difference  1 between these two rates for each investor ( 1              
      , we can find out the average 	 1     		across investors. Note that this average is calculated 
only across investors who had at least one opportunity to repurchase a stock previously sold for  
a gain and one opportunity to repurchase a stock previously sold for a loss between 1999 and 
2006.  
At the individual level, the null hypothesis is  0 :	 1       0  
7:  
                                                            
5 This peak-and-end pattern has been established by Kahneman et al., 1993; Frederickson and Kahneman, 1993; 
Varey and Kahneman, 1992. Other reference points are suggested in the literature: Kaustia (2004) observed that 
when stock prices reach extreme value relatively to previous month, turnover increase significantly. Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) explain that the reference point is the initial purchase price, as it is the benchmark below which 
investors are reluctant to realize losses. Weber and Camerer (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that 
investor update their reference point with new prices when purchase price is too “old”. Arkes et al. (2008) proved that 
investors adapt their reference point depending on their gains and losses. 
 
6 To compute      ,       for each investor, we observe each purchase and check if the stock purchased on that 
day had been sold by the same investor during the previous year. First, note that it’s not enough to find out one sale to 
consider the purchase as a repurchase. We control that the stock has not been already repurchased after the sale. If 
so, the purchase is an additional purchase and is not taken into account in our study. Then, for each day on which the 
investor repurchased, we compute the number of winning and losing sales during the previous year. These are 
repurchase opportunities for this investor, including stocks actually repurchased and those which could have been 
repurchased that day. Lastly, we aggregate winning and losing repurchases and repurchase opportunities of each 
type over time.   
7 The  t-statistic used to test the significance of individual results  is:    
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All quantities previously calculated at the individual level (number of prior winners/losers 
repurchased, number of opportunities to repurchase previous winners/losers) are then 
aggregated across investors to compute       and         as if we considered only one 
representative investor: 
      
     	      	  	     	       	           
     	      	  	             	  	          	     	       
 
 
      
     	      	  	     	      	           
     	      	  	             	  	          	     	      
 
At the aggregate level, the null hypothesis is the following 
8: 
 0 :               0 
Test 2: Impact of anticipated regret. Stock up since being sold versus stock down since 
being sold 
The second kind of regret is known as “anticipated regret”
9  because it is a feeling which is 
expected. As an example, it raises when foreseeing a purchase at a higher price compared to a 
previous opportunity we missed (Tykocinsky and Pittmann, 1998). Prefactual thoughts, such as 
“And what if I find cheaper again?”, appear before decisions, and influence choices (Mc Connell 
et al., 2000). In a context of stock repurchase, the investor compares the price at which she 
previously sold the asset with the current price. If the latter is higher, a repurchase in this case 
would emphasize the fact that the investor could have done better, if she had waited to sell. The 
anticipation of a more intense regret, caused by the idea that she would pay more to repurchase 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
8 The t-statistic used to test significance of aggregated results is:    
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9 Anticipated regret has been modeled in regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), which proposes an alternative 
theory to classical model. In regret theory, expected utility depends on satisfaction about agent’s own choice, and on 
the utility of outcomes she could have obtained. 11 
 
the asset than the sum she received with the sale, will drive her to ignore this investment 
opportunity (Tykocinski et Pittman, 1998). We postulate that investors prefer to repurchase 
stocks that have gone down in price since the sale rather than stocks  that have gone up. 
 
To test our assumption, we compute individual repurchase rate of stocks down since the sale 
      and repurchase rate of stocks up since the sale      : 
 
       
      	  	      	    	     	   	    	           	  	        	 
	      	  	             	  	          	      	    	     	   	    	   	        	 
 
 
       
	      	  	      	  	     	   	    	           	  	        	 
      	  	             	  	          	      	  	     	   	    	   	        	 
 
 
We then compute an average 	 2       of the differences between these two rates ( 2              
      , to test  0 :	 2       0 . 
Note that 	 2     	 is computed across investors for whom we observed at least one opportunity to 
repurchase a stock down and a stock up in price sold during the previous year. 
All quantities previously calculated at the individual level (number of stocks down/up in price 
repurchased, number of opportunities to repurchase stocks down/up in price since the sale) are 
then aggregated across investors to compute      and       as if we considered only one 
representative investor. 
      
     	      	  	      	    	     	   	    	           
     	      	  	             	  	          	      	    	     	   	    
 
 
      
     	      	  	      	  	     	   	    	           
     	      	  	             	  	          	      	  	     	   	    
 
At the aggregate level, the test is the following: 
 0 :               0 
Asides from the fact that we don’t check whether the last sale end in a gain or in a loss, the 
methodology is the same than the one detailed previously. However, each day a repurchase is 12 
 
realized, we compare the current price of the stock repurchased with the sale price to determine 
if the stocks are up or down in price since the sale. Current prices of repurchase opportunities 
are also controlled, to sort up and down opportunities. 
c)  Measures of sophistication 
Although researchers agree on the hypothesis that investor sophistication clearly modifies 
behavior (Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Frazzini, 2006), it is not entirely clear 
whether it promotes more or less rationality. Using direct and indirect proxies for sophistication, 
we thus question the existence of a link between repurchase biases and sophistication. 
In this work, we first consider investors to be sophisticated if they trade foreign assets, warrants  
and bonds. We hypothesize that investors trading foreign assets and bonds are sophisticated 
because they are more likely to be conscious of diversification benefits. Furthermore, trading 
derivative assets requires familiarity with option-like payoffs, which may hint to enhanced 
financial sophistication. Therefore, we sort our population according to these three sophistication 
variables.  
Second, we use average portfolio value (  ) as a proxy for wealth of investors. Notice that 
individual portfolio value      is computed as the average portfolio value of investor, across 
quarters, between 1999 and 2006. We make the assumption that wealthiest investors may also 
afford the costly information given by professional advisors. Thereby, and in accordance with 
previous studies based on demographic variables, we believe that wealth is correlated with 
investors sophistication. For each investor, we compute the average portfolio value across 
quarters between 1999 and 2006. Notice that the average portfolio value is 34’418 Euros, with a 
minimum of  101 Euros and a maximum of 14’244’000 Euros. As the portfolio value is not a 
binary variable, we divide the sample in quartiles. We then create four groups relatively to these 
three values
10.  
To go a step further, we create groups according to the “depth” of investor’s sophistication. To 
do so, we establish a grading system. An investor who does not satisfy any sophistication 
condition gets a score of 0 points. If an investor fulfill only one criteria, she gets one point. Thus, 
an investor who trades warrants, bonds and foreign stocks is rewarded with three points. 
Furthermore, we included the “non binary” variable, to add one point to wealthiest traders. 
                                                            
10 Investors  	who have       4345  belong to the first subsample. If 4345         11723, investors belong to the 
second subsample. If 11723         30372  investors belong to the third subsample. Lastly, investors who have a 
      30372 are in the fourth subsample.  
 13 
 
Investors win one additional points if their average portfolio value (    is above the median 
value (11’723 Euros) computed across all investors. Therefore, to compute the sophistication 
score of investors, we transform this non binary variable into a binary one (      	   .		We 
summarize these variables in table 2. The column 2 in table 2B indicate that sophistication 
variables are not independent at the higher level of significance. In column 3, we give Cramer 
coefficients which measure the degree of association between two sets of variables.  Although 
sophistication variables are not independent, Cramer’s degrees of association are quite low. The 
highest Cramer’s coefficient is 18%, for the association between       	    and 
       	      	       . We conclude that our sophistication variables do not overlap.	
Thus, sophisticated investors fall into five categories depending on their sophistication score 
    . Notice that all variables are equally weighted since each of them allow investors to gain 
one point. Consequently, two investors can be sorted in the same subsamples, without fulfilling 
exactly the same criteria. Finally, 14.6% of investors do not satisfy any sophistication conditions, 
34.1% (resp. 35.9%, 12.9% and 2.4%) fulfill one (resp. two, three and four criteria). Since few 
investors in the sample satisfy all the sophistication conditions, we decide to merge the third and 
the fourth group.  
We perform univariate analyses for the 4 variables, by computing individual results 		 1     			11 and 
	 2     		 for each of the 14 subsets of investors (the three first sophistication variable 
        	        ,       	         and         	      	         are  binary,      is  divided  in 
quartile, and    corresponds to investors score). Next, we test the following hypothesis 
12: 
 0 :  1            1          with             	       ,     	       ,       	     	        
 0 :  2            2         
 0 :  1      	     1      	     with       ,     and     0,1,2,3	13 
 0 :	 2      	     2      	    
                                                            
11  We choose to compute test using the last price as a reference point. 
 
12 t-stat is    
 1      
  0  1      
  1
   1²
 1
    2²
 2
   
 , with 	  ²  
∑   1   0  1       0 ²  
   
      and   ²  
∑   1   1  1       1 ²  
   
   
 
 
13 The index j can take the value of 0 only when       . 14 
 
Notice that individual results are computed only for investors who had at least one opportunity of 
each kind. 
We complete the study of the impact of investor’s sophistication on the decrease of the bias with  
a focus on two new datasets restricted to investors who exhibit a preference for the repurchase 
of stocks previously sold for a gain (resp. the repurchase of stocks down since the sale). 
Therefore we build a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if  1                          (resp. 
 2                       ) was strictly positive. We then model the following linear relationships on 
the subset of positive  1 	investors: 
 1        	              	           	       	          	    	          
where   	is the residual and   ,   ,   	   	  		are the regression coefficients for the explanatory 
variables. Explanatory variables were defined in the preceding paragraphs. A log transformation 
of     is used due to the asymmetric distributions.  
We compute a similar regression for positive  2 	investors. 
 
2. Results   
At aggregate level, in the set of all purchases, 32.1% are repurchases. Therefore, a third of 
purchases are actually repurchases.  
We found that the mean         of individual repurchase rates     is equal to 29%, with a median of 
25%. Note that the difference between the aggregate and the individual result is linked to the 
computations (sum of ratios versus ratio of sums). The distribution of individual repurchase rate 
across our sample of investors is presented in figure 2.  



















































































































































































































We observe several ratios       0 . 5 ,        0.25,     1 ,…) for which the proportions of 
investor are clearly higher than others frequencies. Notice that in each of these particular case, 
at least half of the observations correspond to investors who repurchase only once in the period 
and are specially inactive. More precisely, for      1  this proportion of investors who 
repurchase once (and thus purchase once) adds up to 73%. Actually, the average amount of 
purchases for this category of investors is equal to 11, compared to an average of 91 purchases 
for investors who repurchased more than once in the period.  
We perform an individual repurchase rate analysis for the four subsamples 
  0,  1,  2,   	  3	. Therefore, we try to answer to the following question: What is the role 
played by sophistication in the repurchase propensity of individual investors? Interestingly (see 
table 3), the repurchase rates are the largest for non sophisticated investors (  0), followed by 
the subsample   1 and   2. Yet, there is a slight increase in    as we move from the subset 
  2 to   3. We suggest that this trend is linked to the number of stocks in portfolio. Actually, 
investors who are deeply underdiversified have a greater propensity to repurchase, since their 
set of investment possibilities is limited to a couple of stocks. On the other hand, imagine an 
investor who follow an index market. As she hold many stocks, it’s highly probable that a 
purchase is actually a repurchase.  We estimate the diversification level of investors based on 
the average number of stocks in their portfolio (   ). Consistent with our assumption, investor in 
the sample   0 hold concentrated portfolio (2.64 different stocks on average), whereas investors 
in the sample   3 hold well diversified portfolios (12 stocks on average). The most diversified 
investor in	  0 hold 18 stocks, whereas the one in sample   3 hold 125 stocks. Notice that the 
correlation coefficient between the sophistication score and the average diversification     is 
44.9%.  
 
a)  Repurchase biases, anticipated and experienced regret 
 
Test 1: Impact of experienced regret. Stocks previously sold for a gain versus stocks 
previously sold for a loss  
Table 4A reports the aggregated repurchase rate of prior winners and the aggregated 
repurchase rate of prior losers.              is positive, and this result is highly significant 
     61.2 .	Table 4B show that 		 1        0.0362,     21. The large difference between individual 
results and aggregate results is linked to the computation of      and      for  which  the 
opportunities are cumulated over time. In this case, the difference between a sum of ratios and a 16 
 
ratio of sums can be large. Moreover, the difference between      		and       is positive for 
62.6% of investors      42.7 	14.   
Thereby, our results allow us to reject  0  and  0 : At both the aggregate and the individual 
level, investors are more prone to repurchase stocks previously sold for a gain rather than 
stocks previously sold for a loss. It is worth noting that results lead to the same conclusion when 
the reference price is weighted average purchase price, or the lowest purchase price of the 
stock. However, when the reference price is the highest price that the investor paid to purchase 
the stock, the preference for stocks previously sold for a gain is not confirmed. Indeed, most of 
the sales following the purchase end in a loss (66.17% compared to 29.71% when the reference 
price is the weighted average purchase price). Repurchases of previous losers increase and 
opportunities to repurchase previous losers do so. Mechanically, the proportion of previous 
losers repurchased is higher than the proportion of previous winners repurchased. 
Test 2: Impact of anticipated regret. Stock up since being sold versus stock down since 
being sold. 
Table 5A gives results of the aggregate repurchase rate of stocks down (up) since the sale, 
where               0.02641	     289.3 . At the individual level (table 5B),	 2        0.08607		    
53.2 . We can notice that the preference for repurchase of stocks down since the sale is 
confirmed for 70.80% of our investors      79.4 .  
These results allow us to reject the hypotheses  0  and  0 : At both the aggregate and the 
individual level, investors are more prone to repurchase stocks that have lost value since the 
prior sale rather than stocks that have gained value since the prior sale.  
b)  Sophistication and repurchase biases 
The distribution of individual differences  1 	and  2 	are given in figures 3A and 3B. 
                                                            
14 To test if the frequency      
∑  
 
 of investors who prefer to repurchase previous winners is significant, we realize a 
binomial test: 
 0:	    ~	   ,  ,  0.5 
 1:	    ~	   ,  ,  0.5	 
The t-statistic is    
   
 





Figure 3A: Distribution of  individual difference                           across investors 
 
 
Figure 3B: Distribution of  individual difference                           across investors 
 
 
Even if the differences are positive on average and in both cases, we observe a large cross-
sectional heterogeneity. We try to explain this heterogeneity, based on investor’s characteristics. 
We first study the results of tests realized on the subsets built based on binary variables 
        	       ,      	        and        	     	        (Table 6). 
In each case, results show a positive difference between the repurchase rate of prior winners 
and the repurchase rate of prior losers. The preference for repurchasing stocks down in price 
since the sale is also confirmed. Therefore, investors are, on average, prone to repurchase 
biases, whatever their category (sophisticated or not). We then examine whether the bias is 
deeper for less sophisticated investors, by calculating the differences between	 1      computed on 
sophisticated investors and 	 1       computed on non sophisticated ones. Results show that the 

































































































































































































































































































































































for investors who don’t trade warrants, bonds, or foreign stocks. We thus reject the hypotheses 
 0  and  0 .  
 
Before testing  0  and  0  relatives to non binary variables   	and   , we perform a variance 
analysis on each of them.
15. In each case, we can reject the null hypothesis that means are 
equals across subsets. Therefore we validate the relevance of our following work. 
Next, we study the impact of a demographic variable, using portfolio value as a proxy for wealth 
of investors. Results are presented in table 7. We Observe that   1     	   	 <  1     	   	<  1     	   	< 
 1          and   2     	   	<  2        	< 2        	 < 2     	   	, and results are all significant. This corroborates 
our hypothesis that wealthiest investors, identified by their large portfolio values, engage in more 
rational repurchases.  
 
Lastly, we analyze the results of the four sophistication score subsamples (table 8). The 
conclusion is similar to the previous one, since biases are increasing with the sophistication 
score decreasing:  1     	   		 	 1     	   	 	 1     	   	 	 1     	   		and		 2     	   	  2     	   		   2     	     	 2     	   .	 
Thus, among sophisticated investors, those who satisfy a larger number of our sophistication 
conditions are less prone to repurchase biases.  
According to these observations, we can reject the hypotheses  0   and   0  .Indeed, 
computations on each subset prove that behavioral biases are not equally intense across 
investors. More precisely, repurchase preferences are weakened for more sophisticated 
investors. 
We achieve the study of the role of investor’s sophistication on the decrease of the biases with  
a focus on two new datasets restricted to investors who exhibit a preference for the repurchase 
of stocks previously sold for a gain (resp. the repurchase of stocks down since the sale).  
Regression results (reported in Table 9) show that         ,        	        and 
      	variables have a significant and negative impact on both repurchase biases. Yet,       
has a positive and insignificant impact in each case. This cross-sectional analysis corroborates 
strongly our previous results apart for the       variable. 
                                                            
15 We test the following hypotheses (the tests are similar for  2     	): 
  0:	 1     	       1     	       1            1     	    
  0: 	 1     	     	 1     	     	 1     	   	= 1     	    
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It is worth mentioning that we realize the same regressions on investors who have  1   0  (resp. 
 2   0 ).         ,       	       and       	variables have a significant and positive impact 
on both. Yet,       has a negative impact. Therefore, whatever the sign  1 and  2 (in other 
words, whatever the investors repurchase preferences), sophistication helps to converge to a 
rational behavior according to which  1   0  and  2   0 . 
 
3.  Repurchase biases and portfolio performance 
One might wonder whether the repurchase biases affect portfolio performance of investors. To 
answer to this question, we choose to partition investors based on the sign of their repurchase 
biases. On one hand we focus on the investors who exhibit a preference for the repurchase of 
stocks previously sold for a gain ( 1   0   . In our data 62.6% of investors exhibit a preference 
for the repurchase of stocks previously sold for a gain ( 1   0    and 70.8% of investors exhibit a 
preference for the repurchase of stocks down since the sale ( 2   0   . We term these investors 
“positive bias investors”. On the other hand we examine investors who do not exhibit these 
patterns of preferences ( 1   0  ;  2   0 ). Only 2.03% (resp. 1.47%) of investors exhibit a null 
 1 	(resp.  2 ) and are “non biased” by definition. Finally, we distinguish investors who exhibit 
an opposite behavior( 1   0   . We term these investors “negative bias investors”
16. Notice that 
the average of positive  1  ( 2 ) is  0.1646 (0.1914) whereas the average of negative  1  ( 2 ) 
is -0.1887 (-0.1783). 
Next, we realize an estimation of monthly returns of individual investors from January 2001 to 
December 2006. A mean return across investors is then calculated each month, to create a time 
series of 72 monthly returns
17. In a first case, we compute the monthly return time series with an 
equal weight of individual investors to compute an average result. In a second case, we weight 
each investor with her monthly portfolio value (based on daily portfolio values in the considered 
month) to compute an aggregate result.  
                                                            
16 Our terms “positive bias investors”, “negative bias investors” and “non biased investors” always refer to repurchase 
behavior and do not make any assumption relative to others behavioral biases documented in finance. 
 
17 To be considered in the calculation of the monthly average, an investor must have his account open during the 
entire month. Actually, some investors open an account within the 2001-2006 period, some others close their account 
before the end of the period. On average, 26’532 over 34’129 investors per month have their account open, with a 
minimum of 23’224 in December 2006 and a maximum of 29’186 in April 2003. 53.6% investors have their account 
open during the entire period of our dataset, while the average length of presence is 56 months (4.5 year). 20 
 
To estimate the portfolio performance of investors we employ the framework of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model and estimate Jensen’s alpha by regressing the monthly excess return earned by 
individual investors on the market excess return. The value weighted market index is given by 
the Eurofidai general index (calculated with the methodology of the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP)). This index is based on around 700 stocks over the period under 
consideration. We evaluate the gross monthly return earned by individual investors on average 
(in aggregate), and estimate the following monthly time-series regression:  
                     (           +   
where     is the average (aggregate) monthly return of investors,     is the monthly return on a 
market index, 	   is the market beta,      is the monthly risk free rate and corresponds to the 1-
month Euribor (notice that between 2001 and 2006, the monthly average of the risk free rate is 
0.24%, that is 2.92% annualized) and    is the regression error term.  
In a second step, we employ an intercept test using the three-factor model developed by Fama 
and French (1993): 
                     (           +	                 	   
where      is the monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks minus the 
monthly return on a value-weighted portfolio of big stocks and      is the monthly return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the monthly return on a value-
weighted portfolio of  low book-to-market stocks.    and   	are coefficients on factors size and 
Book to Market.      and      factors are provided by Eurofidai and calculated according to 
the Fama-French (1993) methodology. 
 
We present the portfolio performance of the subsets based on  1  and  2  signs in table 10. 
Panel A (resp. B) presents the regression intercepts relative to the subsets based on  1  (resp. 
 2 ) values. The first column contains results obtained results relative to “positive bias investors” 
whereas the second column concerns “negative bias investors”. The third column is devoted to 
results relative to investors who do not exhibit the repurchase biases. We observe first that all 
intercepts are significantly negatives, which reveals the poor performances of individual 
investors, no matter if they are affected or not by repurchase biases. 
However, we should emphasize the dominance of the alphas for “non biased investors”. Actually, 
both the CAPM and the Fama-French intercepts are significantly higher for these investors than 21 
 
“positive bias investors”. Notice that this result is not significant in the case of the average 
investor for  1 . Therefore, investors who are unaffected in their repurchase decisions by past 
price patterns, overperform investors who back their repurchase trades on emotional incentives. 
Yet, this subset contains less than a handful of investors. Investors are mainly sorted either in 
the positive bias subset, either in the negative bias subset. To infer how the documented 
patterns of repurchase affect portfolio performance, it is more appropriate to compare the results 
obtained on these subsamples. 
The comparison between the alphas relative to positive and negative bias investors is much less 
clear. In fact, the sign of the differences between intercepts varies across the tests and is non 
significant is almost all cases. Consequently, we should conclude that positive and negative bias 
affect similarly performances. In other word, the preference for the repurchase of stocks 
previously sold for a gain and/or the repurchase of stocks down in price since the sale has no 
particular impact on portfolio returns.  
4.  Discussion - Conclusion 
Analyzing repurchase behavior of 34’129 investors between 2001 and 2006, we find that a third 
of the realized purchases are actually repurchases. We hypothesize that maintaining the status 
quo is a strategy to minimize the occurrence of regret. This rate could also mean that investors 
trade the same subset of a couple of stocks, revealing a preferred habitat. Another possible 
explanation, linked to cognitive limitations of agents, can be found in the tendency of investors to 
trade stocks that catch their attention. Precisely, stocks previously sold are attention-grabbing 
stocks since they are still present in investor’s mind. News about the latter are likely to remind 
former trades. Therefore, agents naturally pay more attention to stocks they already held at least 
once. We also underline the link between the repurchase rate and the number of stocks in 
portfolio. 
We then highlight two patterns of repurchase behavior. Firstly, investors are more prone to 
repurchase stocks they previously sold for a gain than stocks they previously sold for a loss. 
This preference for stocks previously sold for a gain can be explained by the tendency of 
investor to make trade that intensifies positive emotions, and reduce pains. When an investor 
realizes a loss she prefers to forget this trade and to ignore the asset associated to a negative 
feeling. At the same time, while she tries to avoid regret, she is more prone to repurchase stocks 
previously sold for a gain, motivated by the pride she felt with this trade. Secondly, investors are 
more prone to repurchase stocks that have lost value since the prior sale rather than stocks that 22 
 
have gained value since the prior sale. This corroborates previous studies on repurchase bias 
which  show that investors’ attention is likely to be caught by change in stock price they 
previously sold. If the observed price has gone down since the sale, the investor is prone to feel 
proud, because she took a timely decision. Thus this particular asset will be associated with a 
pleasant feeling, and is more likely to be repurchased. Indeed, buying this stock at a lower price 
compared to the price sale will emphasize investor’s satisfaction. On the contrary, if the price 
has risen up, the consideration of this stock as an investment opportunity is unpleasant since the 
current price reminds the investor that she could have done better, by selling later. Therefore, 
the investor anticipates that the repurchase will yield regret, and (unconsciously) chooses to 
ignore this stock. Next, based on our original clustering, we show that more sophisticated 
investors, though being prone to the repurchase biases, are less biased than other investors. 
We conclude that sophisticated investors are endowed with financial skills which help them to 
weaken their behavioral bias. Wealthiest investors as well are less likely to be inclined to the 
repurchase biases. This may be explained by an easier access to financial education and 
information or professional advices.  
Finally, we prove that investors who do not back their repurchase decisions on past price 
patterns overperform those who have a preference for the repurchase of sold previously sold for 
a gain and those who have a preference for the repurchase of stocks down in price since the 
sale. It is worth mentioning that this result is a necessary condition for the repurchase behaviors 
to be biases. Actually, if returns are unrelated to repurchase behavior, investors do not have 
interest in adopting a more rational way to repurchase. Yet, nearly 98% of investors exhibit “non 
rational” preferences in their repurchases. We demonstrate that portfolio returns are identical for 
this main part of the population, whatever the direction of the repurchase biases. Therefore we 
can infer that, though investors would gain if they rule preferences, the patterns of repurchase 
we examine in particular do not affect their performance. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of our entire dataset  and of our sample of investors 
who repurchased at least once 
The left column of this table presents statistics on the whole dataset, i.e. 84’500 investors over the period 
1999-2006, and on the sample of investors who repurchased at least once. The right column presents 
statistics on the same period on the 34’129 investors studied in this paper, who repurchased at least once. 
Panel 2 gives information about trading behavior per investor; “Nb of trades/ assets” refers to the number 
of trades/assets computed over 1999-2006. “Nb. of years of activity over 1999-2006” is the number of year 
investors own active accounts: active account are those with at least one transaction over one year. 
“Delay between 2 trades” is the average number of business days between 2 consecutive trades. “Trade 






Investors who repurchased  
















Average number of trades 
  
94 (23)  202 (85) 
 
Average number of assets 
traded  
35 704 (1380)  85 275 (10 500) 
 

















Average cumulated trade 
amount for the period (euros) 
 
370 532 (39 001)  818 327 (196 901) 
-Buy  185 793 (19 529) 
 
411 227 (101 135) 
 
-Sell  184 738 (18 801) 
 
407 099 (95 192) 
 







Table 2A and 2B: Investors sophistication – binary variables 
Table 2A: Description of the variables 
This table presents a description of the selected binary variables to sort investors. The frequencies among 
investors  who repurchased at least once are reported. 
Variables Description  Frequency in 
sample 
Warrants trading 
= 1 if the investor traded warrants during the 1999-
2006 period, 0 elsewhere  20.8% 
Bonds trading 
= 1 if the investor traded bonds during the 1999-2006 
period, 0 elsewhere  13.5% 
Foreign assets 
trading 
 = 1 if the investor traded foreign stocks during the 
1999-2006 period,  0 elsewhere  75.7% 
Binary PV 
= 1 if the average portfolio value of investors during 
the 1999-2006 period is higher than the median value 




Table 2B: Measures of association between variables  
This table contains measures of association (Pearson Chi2 and Cramer coefficients) between 
sophistication variables for the 34’129 investors in the selected sample. ***, ** and * indicate that the 
results are significant respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
















































Table 3: Repurchase rate in the sample and in sophistication score subsets 
This table reports statistics of the individual repurchase rates computed on the sample of investors who 
repurchased at least once, and on the sophistication score subsets. The subsample   0 contains investor 
who do not satisfy any sophistication conditions among        	      	       ,         	       , 
     	        and      11723. The subsample   1 (resp. 2 and 3) contains investors who fulfill 1 (resp. 
2, 3 and 4) of these criteria.  








   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 

































































































Tables 4A and 4B: Preference for stocks previously sold for a gain versus stocks 
previously sold for a loss  
 
Table 4A: Aggregate results 
This table presents a comparison between the aggregate Repurchase Rate of Prior Winners (    ) and 
the aggregate Repurchase Rate of Prior Losers (    ) between 2001 and 2006.      is the ratio of 
number of winners repurchased over number of opportunities to repurchase winners.      is computed in 
a similar way. T-test is in the last row.  





Opportunities to repurchase winners  12 366 035 
PWRR  0.04325 
    
Losers repurchased  236 348 
Opportunities to repurchase losers  6 336 547 
PLRR	 0.0373 
    







Tableau 4B: Individual results 
This table shows the mean  1       	
 
      	∑  1        
    , with 	 1                         
     (    ) is the Repurchase Rate of Previous Winners (Losers). Among our initial population, only 
investors who had at least one opportunity to repurchase a previous winning stock and a previous losing 
stock are considered. T-test is in the last row. 
   26 964 Investors 
 
        
 
0.0362 
t-test  21 
Proportion of investor for whom 
                 
62.6% 
t-test  42.7 
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Tables 5A and 5B: Preference for Stock up since being sold versus stock down 
since being sold 
 
Table 5A: Aggregate results 
This table presents a comparison between the aggregate Rate of Stocks Down since the sale 
Repurchased (    ) and the aggregate Rate of Stocks Up since the sale Repurchased (    ) between 
2001 and 2006.       is the ratio of stocks up since the sale repurchased over opportunities to 
repurchase stocks up since the sale.      is computed in a similar way. T-test is in the last row. 
   34 129 Investors 
Stocks down repurchased   
474 242 
Opportunity to repurchase stocks down  8 451 614 
SDRR	 0.05611 
    
Stocks up repurchased  321 914 
Opportunity to repurchase stocks up  10 837 871 
SURR	 0.02970 
   






Table 5B: Individual results 
This table shows	 2       	
 
      	∑  2        
    , with   2                        
     (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Stocks Down (Up) in price since the sale. Among our initial 
population, only investors who had at least one opportunity to repurchase a stock up in price and a stock 
down since the sale are considered. T-test is in the last row. 
   30 185 Investors 
 





t-test  53.2 
Proportion of investor for whom 




t-test  79.4 
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Table 6: Test results for sophistication subsamples 
This table presents the results of repurchase behavior tests realized on sophistication subsample 
        	          1,        	          0;	     	          1,     	         
0;	       	      	          1;	       	      	       	  0. 
We first report the differences between means  1       	
 
  	∑  1    
    , with 	 1                       . 
      (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Previous Winners (Losers). 
Then, we report the differences between means  2       	
 
  	∑  2    
    , with   2                       .  
     (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Stocks Down (Up) in price since the sale.  
In each case, a comparison of means between the subsets is reported. T-stat controls for the significance 
of our results. 
  
 
        
 
              	       





































































































 Table 7: Test results for portfolio value subsamples 
This table presents the results of tests 1 and 2 realized on portfolio value     	subsamples. Individual 
portfolio value is computed as the average portfolio value of investor, across quarters between 1999 and 
2006. The four subsets are created based on quartile values computed on the sample.  
We first report the differences between means  1       	
 
  	∑  1    
    , with 	 1                       . 
      (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Previous Winners (Losers). 
Then, we report the differences between means  2       	
 
  	∑  2    
    , with   2                       .  
     (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Stocks Down (Up) in price since the sale.  
In each case, a comparison of means between the subsets is reported. T-stat controls for the significance 
of our results. 
   























































































Table 8: Test results for sophistication scores subsamples 
This table presents the results of tests 1 and 2 realized on sophistication score (  ) subsets. The 
subsample    0   contains investor who do not satisfy any sophistication condition among 
       	      	       ,         	       ,      	        and      11723. The subsample   1 (resp. 2 
and 3) contains investors who fulfill 1 (resp. 2, 3 and 4) of these criteria.  
We first report the differences between means  1       	
 
  	∑  1    
    , with 	 1                       . 
      (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Previous Winners (Losers). 
Then, we report the differences between means  2       	
 
  	∑  2    
    , with   2                       .  
     (     ) is the Repurchase Rate of Stocks Down (Up) in price since the sale.  
In each case, a comparison of means between the subsets is reported. T-stat controls for the significance 
of our results. 
 
  






























































































Table 9: Test determinants of the level of the individual repurchase biases 
This table contains results for the linear regression of the repurchase biases. Student t appear in 
parenthesis. ***, **, *indicate that results are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  
Positive   1  investors 
 
 
Positive   2  investors 
 






















































Table 10: Portfolio performance of subsets formed on     and     signs 
 
This table reports estimations intercept for the datasets of investors who exhibit positive negative and null 
repurchase biases. Panel A presents the regression intercepts relative to the samples based on   1  
values and Panel B presents the alphas relative to the samples based on   2  values. CAPM intercept is 
the estimated intercept from a time-series regression of the investors excess return on the market excess 
return. Fama–French intercept is the estimated intercept from time-series regressions of investors excess 
return on the market excess return, a zero-investment book-to-market portfolio (HML), and a zero-














Panel A:    1  
 
  

























































































Panel B:    2  
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